Portland State University

PDXScholar
Economics Faculty Publications and
Presentations

Economics

2-2009

U.S. Current Account Debate with Japan Then, with
China Now
Hiro Ito
Portland State University, ito@pdx.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/econ_fac
Part of the International Economics Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Citation Details
Ito, H. (2009). US current account debate with Japan then, with China now. Journal of Asian Economics,
20(3), 294-313.

This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact
us if we can make this document more accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

U.S. Current Account Debate
With Japan then, with China Now
By

Hiro Ito*
Portland State University
First Draft: August 5, 2008
Second Draft: September 14, 2008
Third Draft: February 6, 2009
Abstract
This paper examines two U.S. current account deficit episodes, one in the 1980s and the other in the
current 2000s, in which Japan and China, respectively, are the current account surplus countries that are
criticized for contributing to the deficits. In both periods, U.S. policy makers pointed out the
underdeveloped and closed financial markets of the current account surplus countries and advocated for
these countries to fix the deficiencies, a position akin to the current “saving glut” argument. In both
episodes, the current account surplus countries have criticized the United States for its low saving,
especially public saving (the “Twin Deficit” argument). This paper presents empirical findings that are
consistent with the Twin Deficit hypothesis; A one percentage point increase in the budget balance
raises the current account balance by 0.10-0.49 percentage point for industrialized countries. The
saving glut argument seems to be applicable only for countries with highly-developed legal systems
and open financial markets. While the United States has been experiencing a savings drought in both
episodes, the Japanese current account surplus was driven by underinvestment in the 1980s and by
over-saving during the 2000s. Furthermore, although the current Chinese current account surplus is
driven by its oversaving, there is no evidence of excess domestic saving in the Asian emerging market
countries; rather, they seem to have suffered from depressed investment in the wake of the 1997
financial crises.
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1.

Introduction

For the last few years, the issue of “global imbalances”–persistent and enormous current
account deficit by the United States matched by surpluses in emerging market countries,
especially in China–has been the topic of intense debate in academic and policy circles. The
outbreak of the current global financial crisis has not wiped away the debate. In fact, many
international economists blame it on the global imbalances; capital exported by current account
surplus countries, they argue, fed American profligacy with cheep credit and caused the housing
bubble. As shown in Figure 1, global capital flows seem to have been lopsided in the last decade.
The U.S. current account reached 5.4 percent as a ratio to GDP in 2007 after leveling off from
6.2 percent in 2006. On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, Japan’s current account surplus
increased to 4.9 percent and that of emerging market economies in East Asia to 8.7 percent.
China’s surplus has risen to an astonishing 11 percent, tripling its size as of 2004.1
One interesting characteristic of the current global imbalances is that the countries
running current account surpluses hold a massive amount of international reserves. As Figure 2
shows, while China has expanded its current account surplus for the last few years, it has also
increased its holding of international reserves. As of the end of 2007, it held $1.5 trillion of
reserves, or 46% of its GDP, after surpassing Japan, the long-time largest holder of international
reserves ($0.9 trillion). In addition to China and Japan, the 10 biggest international reserve
holders include six emerging market economies in Asia, totaling $1 trillion of reserves.2 These
eight economies in total hold $3 trillion of international reserves, accounting for 60% of total
world reserves.
Even before the outbreak of the crisis, many economists had been warning the distortive
effects of the global imbalances on the world economy. They argue that the high volume of
international reserve holdings by current account surplus countries reflects massive foreign
exchange interventions to maintain their currencies at undervalued, competitive values. However,
their intervention efforts also increased liquidity in their economies and created and exported
high inflation in commodities and goods while planting seeds for asset market bubbles with low
1

After peaking in 2006, the U.S. current account deficit started leveling off in 2007 due to then dollar depreciation
and oil price increases. The IMF estimates that the current crisis will considerably weaken the country’s domestic
absorption and thereby improve the current account significantly in the years to come. China, on the other hand, has
experienced its exports hit by the crisis, but its imports have fallen even further since the end of 2008 due to
weakening domestic demand. Hence, China’s surplus is expected to remain at a relatively high level, though not as
high as the 2007 peak – around 9%. It must be noted that oil exporting countries also experienced a rapid rise in
their current account surpluses due to the rapid rises in oil prices in recent years. The (weighted) average of the size
of current account surpluses for this group of countries is expected to be 18 percent of GDP in 2007, almost tripling
from the beginning of the millennium. Figure 1 omits this group for presentation purposes. These imbalances remain
at unprecedentedly high levels. For a review on the historical levels of current account imbalances, refer to Edwards
(2005).
2
The six economies are Taiwan, South Korea, India, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Malaysia.

1

real interest rates.3
The seeds of easy credit also flew to the U.S. economy. That is, the central banks of the
current account surplus countries have invested a large portion of the reserves in U.S.
government bonds, thereby feeding American profligacy by providing easy credit for the
government and home buyers. From this view, called the “saving glut” argument, widening
current account deficits are a foreign-born issue while fiscal profligacy and the housing market
bubble are its by-products. Therefore, the U.S. external imbalance can be solved only if China
and other East Asian emerging market countries mitigate their excess savings. More specifically,
only if these surplus countries develop and liberalize financial markets further, will the influx of
capital to the United States be alleviated (Bernanke, 2005, Clarida, 2005a,b, Greenspan, 2005,
and Hubbard, 2005).
This view is clearly different from the rather traditional “Twin Deficit” argument: the
main cause of the U.S. current account deficit is American profligacy or low saving typically
exemplified as the federal government budget deficits.4 Figure 3 allows one to casually observe
strong (unconditional) correlations between current account and budget balances (though with
some time lag) especially during the 1980s and the 2000s. In this view, the U.S. running current
account deficit is quite natural since the lack of saving in the government and personal sectors
must be complemented by foreign saving, that is, capital inflow.
As the debate intensifies over the Sino-U.S. current account imbalances, many observers
cannot help but think of the current policy debate as a déjà vu of the current account imbalance
debate during the 1980s, in which Japan was the alleged main contributor to U.S. current account
deficits. In fact, there are many parallels in the policy debate exchanges between Japan and the
United States during the 1980s and that between China and the U.S. presently. Currently, the U.S.
claims that China manipulates its currency value and maintains it at undervalued levels so that it
can keep exporting competitively to U.S. markets. Therefore, China needs to change its policy
and revalue the currency. Otherwise, as some U.S. Congressmen argue, trade sanctions need to
be implemented to make up for the competitive prices of Chinese imports due to undervaluation.
Also, it has been argued that China needs to develop and liberalize its financial markets so that
its excessively high level of saving (about 55% of GDP as of 2007) will fall and be used more
effectively locally and regionally instead of flowing to the United States.
In the previous statement, if the word “China” is replaced with “Japan,” it would sound
exactly like the demands made by the United States against Japan in the midst of trade disputes
3

Roubini (2008) argues that commodity and goods inflation caused by current account surplus countries will lead to
a collapse of the “Bretton Woods II Regime”—in which emerging market economies fix or heavily manage their
currency values with U.S. dollars--as was the case in the original Bretton Woods system. Glick and Hutchison
(2008) maintain that China’s intervention efforts seem to have started losing their effectiveness in sterilizing
interventions and controlling inflation.
4
See Chinn (2005) for more on the Twin Deficit hypothesis.
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in the 1980s, especially before the Plaza Accord of 1985.
This paper compares these two U.S. current account deficit episodes, one with Japan and
the other with China. Of course, Japan during the early 1980s and China during the 2000s are
completely different economies with different levels of economic development, placed in
different international economic and geopolitical environments. However, comparing the two
episodes should yield interesting insights and additions to the current debate on the global
imbalances and the interdependent relationship, not just trade but more importantly financial one,
between the United States and China, Japan, and other East Asian economies.
This paper first reviews the similarities and differences between Japan during the early
1980s and China at present in terms of these countries’ economic relations with the United States,
and also of macroeconomic characteristics. Second, a formal panel regression analysis is
conducted to examine the dynamics of current account determination of the United States, Japan,
China, and other East Asian countries in a cross-country context. Third, using the estimation
results, a closer look will be taken at the saving-investment determination of the countries of
interest. Lastly, concluding remarks will be presented.
2. Comparison between Japan during the 1980s and China during the 2000s
2.1 Similarities in Economic Relations with the U.S.
Japan During the 1980s
The current account imbalance between the United States and Japan began to arise in the
early 1980s. In 1982, the United States started running a current account deficit, and in three
years, the deficit increased to three percent of its GDP and peaked at 3.4 percent in 1987 (See
Figure 1). Japan, on the other hand, started running a current account surplus in 1981, and by
1986, the surplus rapidly increased to 4.3 percent, the highest level until 2006. This time period
coincided with the time when some U.S. key industries such as steel, home electronics, and
automobiles were experiencing structural slumps, and partially being replaced by imports from
Japan. Therefore, the current account imbalances inevitably became a politicized issue,
intensifying criticism against Japan.
In the first half of the 1980s, while the White House tried to maintain its laissez faire
attitude toward international trade, Congress intensified protectionism toward Japanese exports.
In fact, protectionism by Congress was not something new as of the beginning of the 1980s.
Starting with measures to restrain Japanese textiles during the 1960s, the U.S. Congress has since
implemented or attempted to implement a number of protectionist measures against Japanese
imports. The targeted industries include: machinery tools, home electronics, steel, automobile,
motorcycle, semiconductor, supercomputer, telecommunications, agricultural products (such as
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orange, beef, and rice), and financial services industries.5
When the U.S. Federal Reserve Board tightened monetary policy in the beginning of the
1980s, the resultant high interest rates caused dollar appreciation, especially against the Japanese
yen, and this led some observers to claim that the yen was manipulatively undervalued.6 They
also argued that Japanese financial markets were underdeveloped and closed, mainly due to
protectionist and meddling administration by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), so that the lack of
attractiveness or accessibility of Japanese financial markets had made people save more as
self-insurance and made Japanese markets less attractive as an investment destination for both
domestic and foreign investors. Hence, personal saving tended to remain high while investment
was not as high as it could have been (given the robust economy then), causing excess net
domestic saving or current account surplus. 7 Therefore, unless Japanese financial markets
became more developed and open, it was claimed, Japan would continue to experience excess
domestic saving, thereby current account surplus, and the dollar-yen value would not be
corrected. Although Japan did not have a fixed exchange rate system during the period – it was
aborted when the country left the Bretton Woods system in 1973 – the United States criticized
Japan for its financial administration policy as an effort to manipulate the currency value.
Against these criticisms, Japan responded to the United States by pointing out that the
main reason for the rise in U.S. current account deficit was due to a reduction in the country’s
domestic saving, especially public saving. In fact, as a result of Reaganomics tax policy and Cold
War-related military spending increased, the budget deficit increased in the 1980s (see Figure 3),
as did the current account deficit. Pointing out that this “Twin Deficit” hypothesis was also
argued domestically, Japan claimed that the United States was merely using Japan as a scapegoat
for its own mismanagement of economic policy.
In 1985, the tension between the United States and Japan over trade relations peaked
when the U.S. Senate passed a resolution condemning Japan for unfair trade practices and urged
a retaliation with 20% tariffs imposed uniformly on all Japanese imports (to remove the effect of
undervalued currency) if Japan did not make efforts to alter currency policy and improve trade
imbalances (Gephardt resolution). This threat, in retrospect, became a strong motive for the
White House to convince the G5 countries to agree on the Plaza Accord in September 1985. In
the agreement, the party countries agreed to jointly intervene the foreign exchange markets to
5

For the overview on the U.S.-Japan trade disputes, refer to Bergsten and Noland (1993).
The Economic Report of the President in 1983, for example, estimated that the U.S. dollar is overvalued against
the Japanese yen by more than 30 percent.
7
In 1983, the U.S. and Japanese governments set up the Yen-Dollar Committee to discuss what these countries
needed to do to “correct” the undervaluation of the Japanese yen and to enhance further financial deregulation and
financial liberalization. As a result of the discussions in this committee, Japan liberalized capital account
transactions in 1984 and started a series of domestic financial deregulation policy in the late 1980s. For the details
on the U.S. exchange rate policy during the 1980s, refer to Frankel (1994), and on Japanese financial
liberalization/deregulation efforts, refer to Nakamura (1994).
6
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guide the U.S. dollar to depreciate against the Japanese yen and Deutsche Mark. As a result, the
yen appreciated considerably in the following years, that is, by 50% by 1989.8 Two years after
the agreement, the Japanese current account surplus finally started shrinking and reduced to
1.5% of GDP in 1990, though it did not lead to its reversal.
In retrospect, the Plaza Accord left a significant impact on the international financial
environment, not just for Japan, but for the entire Asian region. The yen-dollar exchange rate
continued to appreciate against the U.S. dollar and eventually marked the highest value of $1 =
79 yen in April 1995. To the rapid yen appreciation in the immediate aftermath of the Accord,
Japan’s monetary policy reacted by lowering the interest rate, which eventually led to the
creation of the bubble economy in the last few years of the 1980s.9 The high yen also caused
Japanese firms to offshore production bases through foreign direct investment (FDI) to avoid
increased production costs in the domestic market, eventually changing the map of capital flows
within the Asian region significantly.
China in the 2000s
In the 2000s, China has essentially become the world’s manufacturer and rapidly and
persistently widened current account surplus while the U.S. current account deficit has grown
rapidly (Figures 1 and 2). Between 2000 and 2006, China’s exports have quintupled, and
surpassed U.S. exports (in terms of trade volume) in 2007, becoming the world’s second largest
after Germany’s. Already in 2000, China had become the largest contributor to the U.S. trade
deficit, replacing the long-time leading contributor, Japan. In 2007, the U.S. trade deficit with
China was $256 billion (32% of total), about triple Japan’s figure ($83 billion).
China’s strong presence in world trade and penetration into U.S. markets has not always
been welcomed by the United States, which is similar to the case with Japan during the 1980s.
Since 2003, about three dozen bills have been created in the U.S. Congress to challenge alleged
Chinese unfair trade practices (Hufbauer and Brunel, 2008).
Furthermore, China has been accused of manipulating its currency value to maintain
competitive prices in its exports.10 Although it officially ended its fixed exchange rate policy in
8

In fact, in the beginning of 1985, the Japanese yen had already started showing some sign of trend reversal toward
appreciation. Hence, the joint intervention is not the sole contributor to the yen appreciation in the late 1980s,
though there is no question that the Accord exacerbated the appreciation trend by signaling the market. I thank the
editor for pointing this out.
9
The bubble economy was exacerbated by financial deregulation and the government’s efforts to stimulate
domestic absorption, both of which were closely related to U.S.-Japan economic relations. Financial deregulation
and liberalization policies implemented in the mid-1980s, partially as a response from the U.S. pressure, led to
reckless lending by banks that fiercely tried to compensate for thinned profit margins. In the late 1980s, the Japanese
government also tried to stimulate domestic absorption as a means to correct current account imbalances, which had
pro-cyclical nature in the midst of the bubble economy.
10
See the U.S. Congressional Budget Office’s testimony on April 14, 2005. It is also noteworthy that Tim Geithner,
U.S. Treasury Secretary of the new Obama administration, has insisted, since his testimony in the confirmation
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July 2005, China actively intervenes in the currency market and tries to prevent rapid
appreciation.11 As of July 2008, the renminbi has appreciated by 17% since the 2007 revaluation,
but on a real trade-weighted basis, the degree of appreciation is merely 8%. During the same
time period, the U.S. dollar depreciated by 15% on a real trade-weighted basis, indicating that the
yuan’s appreciation is minimal at best.12 In short, China essentially maintains a fixed exchange
rate system. This can be easily evidenced by the rapid rise in the country’s international reserves
holdings in the last few years (Figure 2). As of the end of June 2008, it held $1.8 trillion of
international reserves (equivalent to 50% of the size of the economy), which could pay for about
a year and half’s worth of the country’s imports and is five times the size of the country’s foreign
debt (as of end-2007). By any standards, the size of international reserves holding is massive and
possibly excessive.13 In any case, the massive international reserves holdings is regarded as
circumstantial evidence of China’s efforts to “manipulate” its currency value at undervalued
levels.14
Against this backdrop, the U.S. Congress has attempted to take some protectionist actions
against China. Although they have been already aborted, the two bills proposed, one by Senators
Charles Schumer (D-NY) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC) in February 2005 and the other by
Senators Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) and Max Baucus (D-MT) in March 2006, exemplify the
protectionist movement in the U.S. Congress. The Schumer-Graham bill proposed an imposition
of a 27.5% tariff on all goods from China unless the currency is revalued in such a way as to
correct the trade imbalances: 27.5% is their back-of-envelope estimate of the degree of
undervaluation of the renminbi. The Grassley-Baucus bill proposed that the Treasury Department
work with the IMF to fix the value of the Chinese currency.15
hearing, that China has been manipulating its currency, suggesting that the administration take a more
confrontational approach toward the country than the previous administration.
11
China fixed its exchange rate at 8.28 yuan to the dollar from 1994 to 2005. On July 21, 2005, the reminbi was
revalued by 2.1%, and the exchange rate has since been pegged to a basket of foreign currencies and allowed to
fluctuate within a narrow band (0.3% per trading day, later extended to 0.5%) around the central parity.
12
These are based on the effective exchange rate data published by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS).
13
On whether or not China’s holding of international reserves is excessive, refer to Cheung and Ito (2007) and
Jeanne and Ranciere (2006).
14
The debate on whether and how much the renminbi is undervalued is far from settled. Dunaway, et al. (2006)
estimate the degree of undervaluation ranging from zero to 50%. Cheung et al. (2007) find little statistical evidence
that the RMB is undervalued. Cline and Williamson (2008) survey and compare studies on the degree of renminbi’s
undervaluation. In a more recent paper, by using updated World Bank’s price surveys, Cheung et al. (2009) estimate
the extent of RMB undervaluation to be at most 10% as of 2006.
15
After the abortion of these bills, similar measures have been proposed by Timothy Ryan (D-OH) and Duncan
Hunter (R-CA) in the House, jointly by Senators Schumer, Grassley, Graham, and Baucus, and by Senators
Christopher Dodd (D-CT) and Richard Shelby (R-AL). Unlike the previous bills, these proposals, except for the
Dodd-Shelby bill, do not claim China manipulates its currency value, but instead that the currency value is
“fundamentally misaligned.” Also, these bills stipulate the necessity of corrective actions within the framework of
the WTO system instead of unilateral actions. As of the writing of this paper, none of these bills have been voted on
yet mainly because the current financial crisis has been top priorities in both houses of Congress, though the
recession and the democrats-ruled Congress may reignite the policy discussion. For the review of the newly
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Like in the United States-Japan case, the White House has been, or at least the George W.
Bush administration was, hesitant to appear protectionist and appears to be more cautious about
diplomatic relations. In an effort to fend off protectionist pressure from Congress, the Bush
administration launched cabinet-level meetings between the U.S. and Chinese governments
known as the Strategic Economic Dialog (SED). The topics in the meetings include broad
economic issues between the two countries, not confined to the currency issue, ranging from
market access and intellectual property issues to China’s energy and environmental policies and
the country’s role in the global economy.16
Against fierce pressure from the United States to correct the imbalanced trade
relationship, China has also criticized U.S. economic management, especially the latter’s low
saving rate as Japan did in the 1980s. As Figure 3 shows, the current account imbalance in the
2000s coincides with the deterioration of the budgetary situation since George W. Bush’s
administration increased deficit spending in 2002, resulting from, e.g., tax cuts, the “war against
terrorism”, and the Iraq war (See Figure 3). As was in the case with the 1980s Japan, the Twin
Deficit argument has been revived.
Currently, since commodity inflation became a big global issue between the summers of
2007 and 2008 and the world economy started looking gloomier since then, China’s
macroeconomic management started receiving criticism as the main contributor to these global
issues as previously mentioned.17 In addition to its currency policy, Prasad (2008) argues that the
country’s “repressed” financial system helps keep the real interest rate stuck at low levels which
keeps feeding inefficient banks with ample funds and keeps them from developing proper risk
and profitability management. Hence, more saving floods to speculative asset market activities
and leaves the financial system more exposed to bubble-burst cycles.18 In this view, the lack of
financial development combined with the quasi-fixed exchange rate system can be detrimental to
not just China but also the world economy.

proposed bills and political development on United States-China trade relations, refer to Hufbauer and Brunel
(2008).
16
Although its coverage is not as broad as SED, the U.S. and Japan had a series of high-level comprehensive
negotiations in 1989-90 under the “Structural Impediment Initiatives (SII).” The issues discussed in SII include both
countries’ saving and investment patterns including the necessity for Japan to expand domestic absorption, market
access and deregulation policies in Japan, and government procurement policies in both countries.
17
Roubini (2008) compares the oil shock of 2007-08 with that of the 1970s and argues that in both cases, even
before the oil shocks occur, inflationary environment was already created by current account surplus economies that
actively intervenes in the currency markets but fail to completely sterilize the interventions.
18
Prasad also argues that China’s quasi-fixed exchange rate system rids the country of the ability to implement
appropriate interest rate policy and achieve price stability. In this system, financial markets continue to be exposed
to the risk of asset price bubbles and possible deflation as a result of their bursts. Hence, contrary to the oft-heard
argument that China cannot adopt a flexible exchange rate system because of the lack of financial development, he
argues that the lack of flexibility in the exchange rate hinders financial development in China.
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2.2 Differences in the Economic Structures
We have seen that the arguments against Japan on the current account imbalances during
the 1980s are similar to what China is experiencing at present. However, clearly, these two
economies are different, especially in terms of the stage of economic development. Therefore,
one must be careful in comparing these two economies.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the United States, China, Japan, and other East
Asian economies for two time periods, 1981-85 and 2001-06. This table contains the variables
that can especially affect the current account, or saving-investment, determination (see
Appendix). Let us focus on comparing the economic structure of Japan in 1981-85 with that of
China in the 2000s.19
Unsurprisingly, although the size of the Chinese economy in the 2000s is much bigger
than that of the Japanese economy during the early 1980s, China is still much less developed on
a per capita basis than Japan was in the early 1980s. The output growth rate is quite impressive
for the Chinese economy since the 1980s, recalling Japan’s high growth period during the 1960s.
In both national saving and investment ratios, the Chinese economy surpasses Japan. The
Chinese young-dependency ratio is about the same as that of Japan during the early 1980s, but
the current Chinese old-dependency ratio is not close to Japan’s either in the 1980s or at present.
However, Feng and Mason (2005) among others point out that China is expected to experience a
rapidly aging population.20 Furthermore, Chinese public finance is currently relatively healthy,
but is expected to worsen in the near future given the necessity to stimulate its economy out of
the current crisis, and more importantly, to develop safety net systems for the economically
disadvantaged as well as for the aging population.21
Interestingly, the size of the banking sector, measured by private credit creation (PCGDP)
as a ratio to GDP, and that of the equity sector, measured by the stock market capitalization ratio
(SMKC), both appear to be about the same between the two economies.22 However, the most
important difference between the economies’ financial systems is that China’s banking system is
still heavily dominated by state-owned institutions and thereby extremely inefficient because of
the long-time government direct control of the industry, whereas Japan’s system was relatively
19

The first half of the decade is chosen for Japan because this is the time before rapid appreciation of the yen starts
in 1986.
20
Feng and Mason estimate that the share of population over 64 years old will reach 20 percent among Chinese
urban population by 2023.
21
In November 2008, the government announced that it will implement a 4 trillion yuan ($585 billion) stimulus
package, followed by another announcement in January 2009 of additional 850 billion yuan to extend the coverage
of health insurance over the next three years.
22
However, these statistics need to be observed with a grain of salt. That is, countries in the world have experienced
upward-trending development of financial markets over years. The world (weighted) averages of PCGDP and
SMKC in 1981-85 are 75.9% and 31.7%, respectively, whereas those in 2001-06 are 120.9% and 89.9%. Therefore,
even if the figures are close to each other, it is clear that Japan in the 1980s is more financially developed than China
in the current period.

8

healthy and had strong financial markets (especially in terms of capital adequacy) during the
1980s. It has been also claimed that most of the state-owned banks are loaded with high volumes
of non-performing loans (NPLs).23
Figure 4-a compares the level of financial development among China, Japan, emerging
market economies in East Asia excluding China, and Latin American countries. The measure for
financial development is the sum of private credit creation and stock market capitalization (both
as ratios to GDP, and we call the variable for the sum SIZE) and is shown as the relative size
compared to the United States. The figure shows, again, China’s level of financial development
is about the same as Japan’s. However, if the measure of financial development is adjusted for
the ratios of government ownership of banks by following the procedure outlined by Bekaert et
al. (2006), the size of financial markets, shown as “Adjusted SIZE” in Figure 4-b, for China is
merely 12.7% that of the United States in the 2001-06 period, confirming that China still has a
long road to financial development.24,25
Lastly, Table 1 also shows that Chinese financial markets are closed as shown by the
index for financial openness developed by Chinn and Ito (2006). The index measures how open
financial markets are to capital account transactions (ranging from 0 to 4.3); high values indicate
more financial openness. According to the index, China has had closed financial markets
throughout the time periods, even compared to other emerging market countries in East Asia.
Japan, on the other hand, had achieved a relatively high level of financial openness already in the
early 1980s. China’s closed financial markets stand out especially considering its high level of
trade openness.
3. A Regression Analysis
Although the above section summarized the similarities and differences between Japan
during the early 1980s and China at present, many other factors, naturally including those of the
United States, affect the current account balances of these countries. Given the complexity of the
23

The volume of NPLs disclosed by Chinese authorities is less than 10% of GDP, but the figure is not well-trusted
by western economists, many of whom estimate it to be 30 to 40%. At least, the size of NPLs is argued to be greater
than that of Japan during the late 1990s or the U.S. during the S&L crisis (during both of which, the size was around
eight to ten percent of GDP).
24
Bekaert et al. take the La Porta et al. (2002) estimates of the ratios of government ownership of banks provided
for 92 developed and developing countries for 1970 and 1995. Following Bekaert et al’s method, the “Adjusted
SIZE” variable is created by interpolating the ratios of government bank ownership; adjusting the PCGDP variable
over the sample period for the government ownership ratios; and reconstructing the SIZE variable. Obviously, this
method is not perfect; efforts of privatization are often discrete (e.g., after experiencing a crisis) and also are not
necessarily monotonic in movement.
25
Small bond markets can be also seen as evidence for underdevelopment of Chinese financial markets. Chinese
bond markets, either private or public, are much more underdeveloped compared to those of Japan during the early
1980s (Table 1). Considering that bond markets development requires higher levels of banking and equity sectors,
the Chinese financial markets are still at an earlier stage of development.
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dynamics of current account balances and saving and investment determination, it is most
appropriate and effective to conduct regression analysis, which I am about to do in the following,
with focus on investigating whether the Twin Deficit hypothesis or the savings glut hypothesis is
more applicable.
The dataset that covers a large and heterogeneous group of countries, 19 industrial
countries and 70 developing countries, over the last three decades is used.26 With this dataset,
the panel analysis is conducted as below:
yi ,t = α + β1BudBi ,t + β 2 FDi ,t + β 3 LEGALi ,t + β 4 KAOPENi ,t

+ β 5 (FDi ,t × LEGALi ,t ) + β 6 (LEGALi , t × KAOPENi ,t ) + β 7 (KAOPENi ,t × FDi ,t )

+ X i , t Γ + ui , t

(1)

where yi,t is either the current account balance, national saving, or investment, all expressed as a
share of GDP. BudBi,t is budget balances (as a share of GDP) while FDi,t, LEGALi,t, and
KAOPENi,t are measures of financial development, legal and institutional development, and the
level of capital account openness. Xi,t contains other control variables of “usual suspects” for
current account balances, such as net foreign assets, per capita income, its square, income
growth, terms of trade volatility, young- and old-dependency ratios, trade openness, and GDP
growth rates. The model is based on Chinn and Prasad (2003) and other theoretical and empirical
literature. More careful explanations of these explanatory variables are provided in the Appendix.
Since the primary interest here is medium-term rather than short-term variations in the
current account balances, national saving, and investment, the panel contains non-overlapping
five-year averages of the explanatory variables for each country (except for net foreign asset that
is sampled from the initial year of each five-year period).27 Using a panel of five-year averages
can also mitigate the possibility of significant measurement error in annual data, which can be
problematic especially with developing-country data.
All the variables to be included in the estimation, except for net foreign assets to GDP,
are converted into the deviations from the GDP-weighted world mean before being calculated
into the five-year averages. This conversion is made to prevent trends apparent in some of the
variables from affecting the estimation, and also to make the estimation consistent with open
macro theory that only relative performance of the variables across different markets matters for
the determination of cross-border capital flows.
Furthermore, interaction terms, specifically, those between the financial development and
26

The data are drawn from a number of sources, primarily the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the
IMF’s International Financial Statistics, and the databases associated with Beck, et al. (2001). See the Appendix.
27
The 2001-04 period has been compressed into one observation, and so represents only four years instead of the
standard five.
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legal variables (PCGDP times LEGAL), those between the financial development and financial
openness variables (PCGDP times KAOPEN), and those between legal development and
financial openness (LEGAL times KAOPEN), are included in the estimation. The financial and
legal interaction effect is motivated by the conjecture that deepening financial markets might
lead to higher saving rates, but the effect might be magnified under conditions of better
developed legal institutions. Alternatively, if greater financial deepening leads to a lower saving
rate or a lower investment rate, that effect could be mitigated when financial markets are
equipped with highly developed legal systems. A similar argument can be applied to the effect of
financial openness on current account balances.
Table 2 reports the estimation results for the regressions with the current account,
national saving, and investment as dependent variables and for industrialized countries (IDC),
less-developed countries (LDC), and emerging market countries (EMG) for each. Only the
estimated coefficients of the variables of our focus are reported to conserve space.28
Interestingly, a significantly positive relationship between current account and
government budget balances is detected for all the sample groups, bolstering the prediction of the
Twin Deficit hypothesis. A one percentage point increase (above the world GDP-weighted
average) in the budget balance would lead to a 0.15 percentage point increase in the current
account balance for industrialized countries (IDC), 0.17 and 0.23 percentage points for less
developed and emerging market countries, respectively.
The national saving regression (Columns 4 through 6) shows that a one percentage point
increase in the budget balance leads to a 0.23 percentage point increase in the national saving
rate for industrialized countries and a 0.20 percentage point increase for emerging market
countries, a contrast with the less-developed countries groups, which yields much smaller and
insignificant coefficients.29 With these results, we can surmise that for the IDC and EMG
groups, the government budget balance has a non-Ricardian effect on the national saving rate,
whereas for the LDC, that is not the case.
One can examine whether the above results are not just driven by cross-country
differences, but also by variations within countries’ time series by applying a fixed effects
specification. Interestingly, when a fixed effects model is used, the estimated coefficient on the
government budget balance rises to 0.38, 0.19, and 0.24 for industrial countries, less-developed
countries, and emerging market countries, respectively (all significant at the 1% significance
level). The estimated coefficient of the budget balance variable in the national savings regression

28

Estimation results for other variables are available from the author upon request.
It is also found that Singapore functions as an outlier for the EMG group, especially for the current account and
national saving regressions. When this country is removed from the sample, the magnitude of the estimated
coefficient becomes smaller, though not as small as those for the LDC.

29
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also rises in both magnitude and statistical significance for both developed and emerging market
countries.
One can also suspect simultaneity bias that can arise the possible feedback of the current
account balance on government budget balances. To guard against this possibility, a two stage
least squares (2SLS) estimation is implemented by instrumenting the budget balance variable
with selected variables that are theoretically and empirically considered to be the determinants of
the budget balances.30 Furthermore, to mitigate the effect of business cycles, HP-detrended
annual series of the variables that exhibit business-cycle variation – namely, the budget balance,
net foreign asset, relative income, output growth, and financial deepening (PCGDP) – are also
tested using different model specifications such as fixed effects modes and General Least
Squares. When these different models with or without different data samples are compared to the
results from the above OLS estimation, the magnitudes of the estimates are mostly larger while
the degree of statistical significance remains essentially unchanged, or greater. These different
models show that a one percent point increase in the budget balance is found to lead to a 0.10 to
0.49 percentage point increase in the current account balances, and a 0.17 to 0.81 percentage
point increase in national saving. Thus, we can safely conclude that an improvement in the
government budget balance does improve current account balances, especially for industrialized
countries, and that the improvement is mainly achieved through an improvement in national
saving.
The results on the young- and old-dependency ratios are consistent with the predictions
of the life-cycle income hypothesis; the working population saves while the youth and senior
population dissave. It is interesting to see that the estimated coefficient on the old dependency
ratio is larger in absolute values for developing countries than industrialized countries. Japan’s
speed of aging was faster than the world average change in the old-dependency ratio by 3.7
percentage points between the 1991-95 and 2001-04 period (in each five-year period on
average).31 This change in the old-dependency ratio alone means a fall in the national saving
rate by 1.1 percentage points. However, if China experienced the same speed of aging in a
30

The instruments include the dummy for the left-wing government (LEFT); military spending as a ratio to GDP
(MILEXP); yearly changes in unemployment rates (D_U); the interaction term between LEFT and D_U, and
regional dummies. While other variables are also tested such as the dummy for countries with plural political
systems; government fragmentation (from the Database of Political Institutions by Beck et al. 2001); political
constraint, or democracy, index (from Henisz, 2000); and the standard deviation of tax revenues (following Talvi and
Vegh, 2005), the variables that turned out to be insignificant in the first-stage regression are dropped from the
estimation. The rationale for using these instruments follows the past literature on the determinants of budget
balances such as Roubini (1991), Roubini and Sachs (1989a, b), Persson and Tabellini (2001), and Braconier and
Holden (2004).
31
Japan’s ratio of the old population change in the two periods, so did the world (weighted) average of it change.
Hence, if Japan had changed its old dependency ratio at the same rate as the world average, it would have had no
effect on the saving determination. However, in fact, the deviation of the old dependency ratio from the world
average increased by 7.3 percentage points between the two periods.
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five-year period, it would worsen national saving by 2.4 percentage points. Although the effect
may not sound too significant given the current high saving rate of China (about 50%), since old
dependency does not have a significant impact on investment, the effect on current account can
be big. Using the estimates from the current account regression, the same pace of aging alone
could deteriorate China’s current account by 1.96 percentage points, which is a significant figure
considering the current account surplus level is 4.5% of GDP in the 2001-06 period.
The effect of financial development on saving and investment is noteworthy as well. The
saving regression results show that financial development alone may affect national saving
significantly and positively for industrialized countries, but insignificantly and negatively for
developing countries. In the investment regressions, on the other hand, financial development
seems to affect investment positively and uniformly for developed and developing countries,
suggesting that further financial deepening may alleviate credit constraints.
Since the financial development variable (PCGDP) is interacted with other institutional
variables (LEGAL and KAOPEN), however, we must be careful about the interpretation of the
effect of financial development. Panels A in Table 3 shows the total effect on the current account
if the level of private credit creation (PCGDP) rises by 10% points above the world weighted
average conditional on the levels of LEGAL and KAOPEN, whether their levels are low 10
percentile, mean, or high 10 percentile in each subsample.32,33 For example, the panel for the
group of industrialized countries shows that when an industrialized country equipped with both
legal development and financial openness levels above the high 10 percentile (i.e., the southeast
cell in the matrix) experiences a 10% (relative) increase in financial development, PCGDP, its
current account as a ratio to GDP would worsen by a 0.35 percentage point. From this panel, we
can generalize that only industrialized countries with low levels of legal development would
experience a current account improvement when their financial markets develop regardless of the
levels of financial openness. The bottom table reports the total effect of financial development
for emerging market countries. For this group of countries, the effect of financial development
tends to be bigger for those countries with less open capital accounts and lower levels of legal
development. As far as the EMG group is concerned, further financial development would lead
to current account deterioration only if a country is equipped with high levels of legal
development or with high levels of financial openness (but not with the low 10 percentile level of
legal development).
Panels B and C repeat the same exercise for national saving and investment, respectively.
32

The KAOPEN variable is included in the calculation as the average of the 1996-2004 period.
Between the 1991-1995 and 2001-2004 time periods, the (five-year average of relative) PCGDP level increased
by 20.6 percentage points for industrialized countries, 3.7 percentage points for less developed countries, 8.2
percentage points for Asian emerging market countries, and remarkable 32.4 percentage points for China. Given
these figures, a 10% point increase (above the world weighted average) in PCGDP is a plausible scenario.

33
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Although the total effects of financial development on saving and investment shown in Panels B
and C do not add up strictly to those on current accounts (Panel A) unlike theoretical identity,
examining the effects of financial development on national saving and investment and the net
effect of the two as a proxy to the effect on current account is insightful.34
Panel B shows that, for less-developed and emerging market countries, the effect of
financial development on national saving is smaller for economies with higher levels of legal
development and more open financial markets. Especially for those countries with
underdeveloped institutional infrastructure where it can be presumed that credit constraints and
rationing are severe, the positive impact of further financial deepening on national saving seems
to be considerable. However, it also appears that in order for further financial deepening to lead
to an increase in investment among developing countries through improved financial
intermediation, it is better for countries to be equipped with better legal systems and institutions
(Panel C). Interestingly, Bernanke’s prediction that the more developed financial markets are, the
less saving a country undertakes seems to be validated only by industrialized countries with high
levels of legal development regardless of the openness of financial markets, or emerging market
countries with high levels of legal development and financial openness. These results seem to
bolster Bernanke’s argument that more financial development will solve the issue of the savings
glut in emerging market countries with high levels of both legal development and financial
openness. Now, is this finding applicable to emerging market Asian countries?
Panel D of Table 3 categorizes emerging market countries in East Asia depending on the
level of legal development and financial openness. The matrix shows that only Hong Kong and
Singapore are categorized as countries with highest 10 percentile legal development and highest
10 percentile financial openness, while many Asian emerging market countries are categorized in
the groups with the middle or lower level of legal development and financial openness. Figure 5
reports the total effects of a 10 percentage point increase in PCGDP on current account, national
savings, and investment for Asian emerging market countries and three industrialized countries,
Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom using actual values for each country’s legal
development and financial openness measures. 35 According to Figure 5, Hong Kong and
Singapore are the only countries for which financial development will cause a negative impact
on national saving. Other countries will experience an increase in the ratio of national saving to
34

At least, two issues can be pointed out as the reason for the failure of the identity for the estimated coefficients.
First, while the current account regressions account for the covariance of national savings and investment, simply
adding two coefficients does not. Second, the data for current account, based on the Balance of Payments accounting
definition, and those for national saving and investment, based on the National Income and Product Accounts
definition, can be defined in different ways in some countries, making the original current account data not
necessarily equal to the difference between national saving and investment.
35
All of the three IDCs belong to the category of middle-level legal development and most open financial markets
in the matrix for the industrialized countries (not reported).
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GDP if financial markets develop further. Interestingly, for all countries, financial development
leads to the expansion of investment, presumably because of improved credit conditions and
financial intermediation. Furthermore, in terms of the effect on net saving–not necessarily the
same as that on the current account–all countries except for Indonesia and the Philippines will
experience worsening of net saving as a result of further financial deepening because the
magnitude of the effect on investment exceeds that on national saving. China experienced a
stunning 32.4 percentage point increase in private credit creation (net of change in the world
weighted average). This financial development alone led to an increase in national saving by 1.7
percentage points, but also an increase in investment by 2.4 percentage points, suggesting a
negative effect of financial development on net saving, not through a reduction in saving, but
through a higher increase in investment than that in saving. Armed with these results, I conclude
that financial development reduces the level of current account balances, especially for Asian
emerging market countries, but that effect is achieved, not through a reduction in saving rates,
but through increased levels of investment.
4. Are the Current Account Imbalances Atypical in the early 1980s and/or the 2000s? What
Drives the Imbalances?
We next ask how the patterns of current account imbalances are compared to what can be
predicted by the model. Especially, we ask whether the current external imbalances were atypical
in the two periods of our interest. And if so, what was driving them? Are they driven by
deviations in national saving or investment?
First, we ask these questions for the 1980s episode. For that, out-of-sample predictions
are made for the two five-year periods after 1980, using the model employed in the previous
section and the data up to 1980.36 This exercise allows us to observe how much the actual
current account balances in the post-1980 period differ from what could be predicted using the
relationships that were obtained up to 1980. Figure 6 compares the actual values of current
account balances, national saving, and investment all as a proportion of GDP with the predicted
values of each for the United States and Japan.37
From the figures in the top row, we can observe that for the 1981-85 and 1986-90 periods,
the U.S. experienced worse current account balances than is predicted by the model. The
unpredicted current account deficit is mainly driven by deterioration of national saving in these
36

Since the time fixed effects for the post-1980 periods are not available, the average of the time effects for the
1971-1980 period is used. Generally, when we examine a subsample, the predicted values will be based on the
estimation for that sample group. For example, the predicted values for the group of industrialized countries will be
based on the estimation results from the regressions for the subsample, and the predictions for non-industrialized
countries will be based on the estimation for EMG subsample, etc.
37
The same exercise is not conducted for China due to data unavailability.
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periods; although both national saving and investment are lower than was predicted by the model,
the underperformance of national saving appears to be more severe than that of investment.
Japan, on the other hand, experienced unpredictably better current account balances throughout
the post-1980 period. However, the rise in current account surplus during the 1980s is driven
mainly by underperformance of investment, rather than over-saving. This finding is consistent
with the claim by the United States that Japan did not have enough investment opportunities,
though over-saving seems to be more of an issue in the 1991-95 period.
The same exercise is repeated for the 1996-2000 and 2001-04 periods for the United
States, Japan, China, and Emerging Asia excluding China, using the estimated coefficients from
the regressions implemented over the 1971-95 time periods.
Figure 7 presents a little different picture from Figure 6 for the United States. The actual
U.S. current account deficit of the 2001-04 period turns out to be worse than the model
prediction by 2.4%. The figures for U.S. national saving and investment show that while the U.S.
current account deficit is driven by more-than-expected performance in investment in the
1996-2000 period, the deficit during the 2001-04 period is driven more by “saving drought,”
rather than “investment boom.” In the case of Japan (whose figure is omitted to conserve space),
as was in the case with the 1980s, Japan kept experiencing larger current account surpluses than
was predicted by the model in the post-1995 period. However, unlike the previous case, the
over-performance of current account balances in the post-1995 period is attributed to
over-saving.38
Over-performance of current account balances is much more apparent for China in the
post-1995 period as shown in the bottom of Figure 7. While its investment performed better than
was predicted by the model, the outperformance of national saving is much more significant,
indicating that the country’s current account surplus is clearly driven by over-saving. Hence, the
cause of China’s current account surplus in the 2000s is clearly different from that of Japan’s
during the 1980s.
Interestingly, however, the over performance of current account balances for the Asian
emerging market group excluding China is a result of the collapse of investment in the aftermath
of the Asian crisis. The Asian emerging market countries’ level of national saving is about the
same as what is predicted by the model predicts in the post-1995 period, countering the global
saving glut argument, but the investment rate for this region has been lower than predicted (by
three to four percentage points), especially in the 1996-2000 period, suggesting that East Asia is
undergoing an investment drought presumably as a result of the Asian crisis of 1997-98.39

38

Japan’s investment is better than the model prediction in both the 1996-2000 and 2001-04 periods, but its national
saving outperformed the model prediction by a much larger degree.
39
This finding is consistent with that of Higgins (2005).
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5. Concluding Remarks
This paper examined the two U.S. current account deficit episodes, one in the 1980s and
the other in the current 2000s, and compared the countries that contributed most to U.S. trade
deficits in the two time periods, Japan and China, respectively. Many similarities are found
between Japan in the early 1980s and China at present in terms of the way some U.S. policy
makers politicize the issue and criticize the surplus countries. In both episodes, U.S. policy
makers pointed out the lack of financial development and the closed nature of the financial
systems of the current account surplus countries. In return, the current surplus countries
criticized the United States for its low saving, particularly, public saving. Hence, both episodes
witnessed the debate between the saving glut hypothesis and the twin deficit hypothesis. This
paper also found the differences between the two economies in the level of financial
development and financial openness; China is expected to experience further financial
development and financial opening in the future.
A regression analysis is conducted to examine the medium-term determinants of the
current account using a model that controls for institutional factors, such as financial openness
and legal development, with a focus on the United States and emerging market countries in Asia.
The regression analysis confirms that budget balances play an important role in the
determination of current account balances. Among industrialized countries, a one percentage
point increase in the budget balance is found to raise the current account balance by 0.15
percentage point, and this significant effect is also detected for less-developed countries and
emerging market countries. Furthermore, this study found evidence that the oft-cited argument
about the effect of financial and legal development as well as financial liberalization is only
applicable to a group of countries with high levels of legal development and financial openness,
such as industrialized countries and high income emerging market economies such as Hong
Kong and Singapore. This suggests that the policy recommendations made by the global saving
glut proponents have only a tenuous empirical basis insofar as they relate to East Asia.
It was also found that the Japanese current account surplus in the early 1980s was not
driven by over-saving, contrary to the argument presented at the time, but by underperformance
of investment whereas the country’s current account surplus in the 2000s was found to be driven
by over-saving. The United States has been experiencing a saving drought throughout the last
two decades, and that is the main reason for its current account deficit. Although the recent
current Chinese current account surplus is driven by its over-saving, among the East Asian
emerging market countries (excluding China), saving is not found to be excessive. Rather, these
countries have experienced a shortfall in investment in the post-Asian crisis period.
So, what do all these findings mean? First, as was spelled out in the APEC Finance
Ministers Joint Ministerial Statement in September 2006, it is a “shared responsibility” of the
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countries on both sides of the Pacific Ocean, i.e., the United States and East Asian economies, to
take “joint action towards an orderly readjustment of global imbalances”; while East Asian
economies can develop financial infrastructure in the region, it is necessary for the United States
to do its own homework, i.e., reduce the budget deficit. This study showed that improving the
budget balance can affect current account balances.40
Second, when China, and other East Asian countries experience further financial
development and financial opening, it cannot be expected that these countries will experience a
decline in the saving rate. As we show, financial development will lead these countries to
experience a further rise in the saving rate, not a decline as discussed by the saving glut
proponents.
Third, while further financial development cannot be expected to lead to an decrease in
the saving rate or current account, it will lead to more investment, which would contribute to a
decline in the current account surplus for these countries. The shared work on the Asian side
should also include encouragement for absorption, namely more consumption and investment in
the region. For China, which already has high levels of investment, this means that the country
needs to invest more in education, improvements in infrastructure and sanitary conditions in the
rural areas, and safety nets for the economically disadvantaged and for the aging population. For
other East Asian countries, they need to regain the investment that has plunged since the Asian
crisis. Investment expansion in the Asian region could lead to establishment of the recycling
system for the region’s current account surpluses, especially those of China.
Lastly, the United States and Japan need to be prepared for the significant change in the
direction of capital flows in the region. Correcting global imbalances for the United States means
that capital inflows to the country will most likely decline, which can have a significant impact
on U.S. financial markets. On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, China may experience what
Japan experienced in the aftermath of the Plaza Accord of 1985. That is, further appreciation of
the renminbi is most likely to raise Chinese labor costs, and along with financial development
and financial opening, that can lead to China’s capital flowing to the rest of the Asian region (just
as Japanese FDI increased in the rest of Asia). This trend will be supported as China’s industrial
structure becomes more capital- and/or technology-intensive, while increasingly outsourcing
labor-intensive industries abroad. Furthermore, Japan’s demographical change and further
financial opening and development may also lead the country to become a capital importer. At
the very least, policy makers in these countries need to be prepared for tidal changes in the
40

In fact, in June 2006, the IMF has launched the Multilateral Consultation on Global Imbalances to provide a
platform for the countries that are a direct party to the existing global imbalances to discuss corrective measures fort
the global imbalances. Five countries and regions are the participants: China, the euro area, Japan, Saudi Arabia (to
represent oil exporting countries), and the United States. The progress made by the participant countries is
occasionally reported by the IMF.
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regional capital flows.
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Appendix: Determinants of Current Account Balances, National Saving, and Investment
Macroeconomic Factors
Net foreign assets: From an intertemporal perspective, the stock of net foreign assets
(NFA) serves as an important initial condition, given that the current account is the sum of the
trade balance and the return on a country’s stock of NFA (or payment on its net foreign
liabilities position). Alternatively, from a buffer stock savings perspective, higher levels of
initial net foreign assets should be associated with subsequent lower current account balances.
Government budget balances: A variety of models predict a positive relationship
between government budget balances and current accounts over the medium term. In the
absence of a full Ricardian offset via private saving, an increase in the government budget
balance could lead to an increase in national saving. In developing economies, where a greater
proportion of agents may be liquidity constrained, this relationship might be expected to be
more pronounced.
Relative income: The “stages of development” hypothesis for the balance of payments
suggests that countries, as they move from a low to an intermediate stage of development,
typically import capital and, therefore, run current account deficits. As they reach an advanced
stage of development, countries run current account surpluses in order to pay off accumulated
external liabilities and also to export capital to less advanced economies.
Demographics: Based on the life-cycle income hypothesis, working population is the
savers while the youth and senior population is dissavers. Masson et al. (1998) and among many
others show that the dependency ratio is one of the key determinants of private saving.
Uncertainty: Terms of trade volatility is another potential determinant of medium-term
fluctuations in current accounts. Agents in economies that face more volatile terms of trade
might save more for precautionary reasons in order to smooth their consumption streams in the
face of volatile income flows.
Trade Openness: Country characteristics that reflect macroeconomic policies could
also be relevant for current account determination. The degree of openness to international trade
could reflect policy choices, including tariff regimes.
Growth Rates: Countries with high labor productivity growth may attract more capital
inflows with higher expected rates of returns in their asset markets, as has been argued to be the
case with the U.S. whose buoyant labor productivity growth may have been the main cause of
the recent rise in current account deficits. Real output growth rates can be used as a proxy to
productivity growth in a regression exercise.
These macro data are drawn primarily from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators, the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and the World Economic Outlook
database. The measure of net foreign asset is extracted from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).
Institutional Factors
Financial Development/Deepening: There are at least two conflicting predictions on
the effect of financial development on saving. One is the “financial deepening” argument, and
the other is the precautionary saving argument. The financial deepening argument [emphasized
by Edwards (1996)] is that further financial development, often proxied by the ratio of a
monetary aggregate such as M2 to GDP, also means the depth and sophistication of the financial
system so that financial deepening could induce more saving. The precautionary saving
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argument is that more developed financial markets lessen the need for precautionary saving, and
thereby lower the savings rate. The global savings glut argument presented by Bernanke (2005)
and Clarida (2005) is based on this view; less sophisticated financial markets motivate people to
save for precautionary reasons. Conversely, the sophisticated equity markets in the U.S. absorb
excess saving from all over the world, leading to higher current account deficits. For the
measure of financial development, private credit to GDP (PCGDP) from the World Bank’s
Financial Structure Dataset (Beck, et al., 2001 and subsequent updates) is used primarily for
data availability reasons.
Financial Openness: The degree of a country’s capital account openness should also
affect capital flows across countries, and therefore the current account. Countries with open
financial markets could allow agents to export excess saving to or import it from countries with
developed financial markets such as the U.S. Thus, the openness of financial markets should
influence countries’ current account balances via the impact on saving and investment decisions.
The Chinn-Ito (2006) index (KAOPEN) is used to measure the degree of financial openness.
This index is the first principle component of the binary variables pertaining to cross-border
financial transactions based upon the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Higher values of this index indicate greater financial
openness. Greater detail about the construction of this index can be found in Chinn and Ito
(2008). The data are available at http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/.
Legal/Institutional Development: A society’s legal foundations and institutions define
the context wherein financial transactions and economic decisions are made. Whether the legal
system clearly establishes law and order, minimizes corruption, or whether the administrative
branch of the government protects property rights efficiently are all important determinants of
the incentives to save and invest. Decisions by foreign residents will also be affected. The
variable LEGAL is used to incorporate the effect of legal and institutional development, which is
the first principal component of law and order (LAO), anti-corruption measures (CORRUPT),
and bureaucracy quality (BQ). Higher values indicate better conditions. The data series are
available from ICRG for the period of 1984 through 2004, but are included in the regression as
the period-average.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics – U.S., China, Japan, and Emerging Market East Asian Economies in 1981-85 and 2001-06
United States
period

China

2001-06

5,251.0

16,472.9

24,536.0

6,275.7

13,428.7

3,487.1

8,174.1

4.2

14.7

72.5

68.8

27.6

37.6

15.3

22.9

10,428.0

990.6

6,795.1

1,964.6

3,130.9

269.6

819.2

339.7

1,038.4

100.0

100.0

18.6

65.2

36.9

30.0

5.1

7.9

6.4

10.0

3.3

2.5

10.8

9.8

3.1

1.5

5.0

5.1

4.7

5.2

Current Account Balance (% of GDP)

-1.4

-5.1

0.2

4.5

1.9

3.3

-3.6

6.2

-4.4

3.2

National Saving (% of GDP)

18.3

13.6

34.7

45.6

30.9

26.5

26.8

30.8

23.1

30.4

Investment (% of GDP)

20.1

18.6

35.0

41.2

29.5

23.4

29.7

23.9

27.1

24.7

Young dependency ratio (%)

32.8

31.6

51.8

32.4

33.1

21.1

57.7

39.8

65.0

44.8

Old dependency ratio (%)

17.3

18.4

7.9

10.6

14.4

28.4

6.9

9.9

6.3

8.6

Budget balance (%)

-4.3
93.9

-1.9

-0.4

-6.2

-2.7

-0.9

-4.2

-1.9

179.9

74.5*1

-2.5
127.9

-3.2

Private credit creation (% of GDP)

126.9

110.3

49.7

86.7

41.9

70.9

Stock Market Capitalization (% of GDP)

47.5

42.9

76.7

37.8

121.2

12.5

58.7

Stock Market Total Value (% of GDP)

19.2

19.5

77.8

7.6

77.3

2.7

48.4

Ratio to the U.S.
GDP in constant 2000 PPP (billion)
Ratio to the U.S.
Output growth rates (%)

Private Bond Market Cap. (% of GDP)
Public Bond Market Cap. (% of GDP)
Financial Openness*
Trade openness (%)

4

2001-06

22,757.3

35,656.9

966.3

100.0

100.0

5,322.1

69.8*

3

52.1*

3

4.3

131.5
211.0
110.2
44.0
4.3

1981-85

2001-06

5.8*

2

39.7

8.0*

2

35.3

4.7*

3

8.8

3.9*

3

0.7

40.3*

3

15.9

45.6*

3

0.7

4.2

59.1

18.2

45.5
121.4
4.2

1981-85

2001-06

Emerging Asia
excluding Tigers

1981-85

Per capita GDP in constant 2000 PPP

1981-85

ex-China emerging
Asia

Japan

8.1*

3

17.4*

3

2.6

21.1
28.4
2.4

1981-85

2001-06

8.1*

3

15.1*

3

2.0

21.5
30.1
1.8

23.0
27.2
75.3
55.9
25.2
24.5
172.
103.7
Notes: *1 – 1986 – 1990; *2 – 1991 – 1995; *3 – 1990. *4 – Financial openness is measured using the index on the openness of capital accounts developed by Chinn
and Ito. Its range is [0, 4.4]. Higher values of this index indicate greater financial openness. “ex-China Emerging Asia” include Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. “Emerging Asia excluding Tigers” exclude Hong Kong and Singapore from the previous group. The statistics for
these groups are shown as weighted averages based on GDP in U.S. dollars.
Sources: World Bank World Development Indicator, IMF International Financial Statistics, Chinn and Ito (2008), World Bank Financial Structure Database
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Table 2: Current Account, National Saving, and Investment Regressions, 1971 – 2004
Dependent variable:

Five-year average of
Current Account (% of GDP)

Five-year average of
National Saving (% of GDP)

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
IDC
LDC
EMG
IDC
LDC
EMG
Gov’t budget balance
0.154
0.168
0.23
0.233
0.094
0.204
[0.095]*
[0.079]**
[0.075]*** [0.096]**
[0.062]
[0.079]**
Net foreign assets (initial)
0.069
0.047
0.041
0.059
0.054
0.052
[0.011]***
[0.005]*** [0.009]*** [0.011]*** [0.007]*** [0.010]***
Young dependency ratio
-0.027
-0.076
-0.044
-0.365
-0.173
-0.108
[0.082]
[0.022]***
[0.023]*
[0.076]*** [0.025]*** [0.028]***
Old dependency ratio
0.099
-0.368
-0.529
-0.305
-0.793
-0.668
[0.098]
[0.096]*** [0.127]*** [0.100]*** [0.122]*** [0.173]***
Financial Develop. (PCGDP)
0.01
-0.043
-0.082
0.041
-0.02
-0.027
[0.012]
[0.032]
[0.038]** [0.015]***
[0.042]
[0.043]
Legal development (LEGAL)
0.002
-0.017
-0.018
0.006
-0.03
-0.027
[0.007]
[0.008]**
[0.010]*
[0.007]
[0.010]***
[0.015]*
PCGDP x LEGAL
-0.035
-0.021
-0.037
-0.04
-0.032
-0.037
[0.015]**
[0.011]*
[0.016]**
[0.016]**
[0.015]**
[0.020]*
Financial open. (KAOPEN)
-0.002
0.002
0.008
-0.015
-0.01
0.006
[0.003]
[0.007]
[0.010]
[0.004]***
[0.008]
[0.011]
KAOPEN x LEGAL
0.012
0.002
0.005
0.011
-0.002
0.001
[0.003]***
[0.002]
[0.003]
[0.003]***
[0.003]
[0.004]
KAOPEN x PCGDP
0.002
0
-0.002
0.007
-0.004
-0.002
[0.009]
[0.007]
[0.009]
[0.011]
[0.008]
[0.011]
Observations
126
345
203
126
344
203
Adjusted R-squared
0.55
0.46
0.51
0.66
0.67
0.67
Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The estimated coefficients for the other variables including the time-fixed dummies and constant are not shown.
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Five-year average of
Investment (% of GDP)
(7)
IDC
0.093
[0.081]
0.004
[0.007]
-0.393
[0.062]***
-0.419
[0.071]***
0.041
[0.008]***
0.001
[0.005]
-0.016
[0.010]
-0.01
[0.003]***
-0.006
[0.003]**
-0.005
[0.008]
126
0.75

(8)
LDC
-0.082
[0.049]*
-0.005
[0.004]
-0.046
[0.021]**
-0.245
[0.106]**
0.067
[0.034]**
0.009
[0.009]
0.018
[0.012]
-0.016
[0.007]**
-0.002
[0.002]
-0.017
[0.007]**
344
0.55

(9)
EMG
-0.137
[0.063]**
-0.001
[0.009]
-0.062
[0.026]**
-0.111
[0.135]
0.054
[0.038]
-0.01
[0.014]
0.002
[0.018]
-0.01
[0.008]
-0.004
[0.003]
-0.008
[0.009]
203
0.65

Table 3: Total Effects of a 10% increase in Financial Development (PCGDP)
conditional on legal development and financial openness
B. National Saving

A. Current Account
KAOPEN [0, 4.38]
Industrialized countries

LEGAL
[0, 6.51]

Low
10 percentile (4.37)
Mean
(5.69)
High
10 percentile (6.47)

KAOPEN [0, 4.38]

Low
10 percentile
(3.55)

Mean
(4.22)

High
10 percentile
(4.38)

0.365

0.379

0.382

-0.095

-0.082

-0.079

-0.370

-0.357

-0.354

Industrialized countries

LEGAL
[0, 6.51]

Low
10 percentile (4.37)
Mean
(5.69)
High
10 percentile (6.47)

Low
10 percentile
(3.55)

Mean
(4.22)

High
10 percentile
(4.38)

0.606

0.653

0.664

0.079

0.127

0.137

-0.235

-0.187

-0.177

KAOPEN [0, 4.38]
Less developed countries

LEGAL
[0, 6.51]

Low
10 percentile (1.15)
Mean
(2.48)
High
10 percentile (3.89)

KAOPEN [0, 4.38]

Low
10 percentile
(0.66)

Mean
(1.82)

High
10 percentile
(4.08)

0.408

0.408

0.408

0.127

0.127

0.127

-0.167

-0.167

-0.167

Less developed countries

LEGAL
[0, 6.51]

Low
10 percentile (1.15)
Mean
(2.48)
High
10 percentile (3.89)

Low
10 percentile
(0.66)

Mean
(1.82)

High
10 percentile
(4.08)

1.257

1.210

1.120

0.828

0.782

0.691

0.380

0.333

0.243

KAOPEN [0, 4.38]
Emerging market countries

LEGAL
[0, 6.51]

Low
10 percentile (1.66)
Mean
(2.96)
High
10 percentile (4.50)

KAOPEN [0, 4.38]

Low
10 percentile
(0.66)

Mean
(1.90)

High
10 percentile
(3.96)

0.528

0.503

0.462

0.058

0.033

-0.008

-0.523

-0.548

-0.589

Emerging market countries

LEGAL
[0, 6.51]

NOTE: The tables show the total effect on current account (Panel A) and national
saving (Panel B) if the level of PCGDP rises by 10% points (above the world
weighted average) conditional on whether the levels of LEGAL and KAOPEN are
low 10 percentile, mean, or high 10 percentile in each subsample.
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Low
10 percentile (1.66)
Mean
(2.96)
High
10 percentile (4.50)

Low
10 percentile
(0.66)

Mean
(1.90)

High
10 percentile
(3.96)

1.106

1.081

1.040

0.636

0.611

0.570

0.055

0.031

-0.011

(continued)
D: Matrix for Emerging Asia

C. Investment
KAOPEN [0, 4.38]
Industrialized countries

LEGAL
[0, 6.51]

Low
10 percentile (4.37)
Mean
(5.69)
High
10 percentile (6.47)

KAOPEN

Low
10 percentile
(3.55)

Mean
(4.22)

High
10 percentile
(4.38)

0.612

0.579

0.571

0.402

0.368

0.360

0.276

0.242

0.235

Low
10 percentile
(1.66)

LEGAL
KAOPEN [0, 4.38]
Less developed countries

LEGAL
[0, 6.51]

Low
10 percentile (1.15)
Mean
(2.48)
High
10 percentile (3.89)

Low
10 percentile
(0.66)

Mean
(1.82)

High
10 percentile
(4.08)

0.713

0.515

0.131

0.954

0.756

0.372

1.206

1.009

0.624

High
10 percentile
(4.50)

LEGAL
[0, 6.51]

Low
10 percentile (1.66)
Mean
(2.96)
High
10 percentile (4.50)

Low
10 percentile
(0.66)

Mean
(1.90)

High
10 percentile
(3.96)

0.829

0.729

0.565

0.854

0.755

0.590

0.886

0.786

0.621

Mean
(1.90)

Bangladesh

Indonesia,
Philippines,
Sri Lanka

China

India, Korea,
Malaysia,
Thailand,
ex-China EA

High
10 percentile
(3.96)

Hong Kong,
Singapore

NOTE: The panel categorizes emerging market countries in East Asia
depending on the level of legal development and financial openness.

KAOPEN [0, 4.38]
Emerging market countries

Mean
(2.93)

Low
10 percentile
(0.66)

NOTE: The tables show the total effect on investment if the level of
PCGDP rises by 10% points (above the world weighted average)
conditional on whether the levels of LEGAL and KAOPEN are low 10
percentile, mean, or high 10 percentile in each subsample.
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Figure 1: Current Account Balances for U.S. and Major Countries and Region
1980 – 2007
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Sources: International Financial Statistics, World Development Indicator, author calculation

Figure 2: Current Account Balances and International Reserve Holdings:
Japan and China, 1980 – 2007
% of GDP
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Figure 3: U.S. Budget Balances and Current Account Balances (% of GDP),
1980 – 2007
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Figure 4-a: Comparison of Financial Development
Using SIZE (Private Credit Creation + Stock Market Capitalization)
Normalized Against the U.S.
Fin. Market Development (size), US=100
150
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Sources: Beck et al. (2001, updates), author calculation

Figure 4-b: Comparison of Financial Development
Using Adjusted SIZE (Adjusted Private Credit Creation
+ Stock Market Capitalization) Normalized Against the U.S.
Fin. Market Development (Adjusted SIZE), US=100
150
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Sources: Beck et al. (2001, updates), author calculation
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Figure 5: Effects of a 10% Change in Financial Development (PCGDP)
on Current Accounts, Saving, and Investment, IDC and Emerging Asia
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Figure 6: Out-of-sample Predictions of Current Accounts, using the Estimates based on the Data up to 1980
(a) United States
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Figure 7: Out-of-sample Predictions of Current Accounts, using the Estimates based on the Data up to 1995
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